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In re D.T., 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 23 (May 25, 2017)1 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: DUE PROCESS FOR JUVENILE DEFENDANTS IN ADULT 
PROCEEDINGS 
 
Summary: 
 
 The Nevada Supreme Court held that the juvenile court properly certified a juvenile as an 
adult because the seriousness of his offense and his prior adjudications outweighed the subjective 
factors in Seven Minors. Additionally, the Court held that a court’s certification of cognitively 
impaired juveniles for adult proceedings does not offend the Eighth Amendment. 
 
Background: 
 
 This matter involves a juvenile, D.T., who snuck into S.B.’s room, a minor and D.T.’s ex-
girlfriend, through a back window to retrieve his cellphone twenty days after they ended the 
relationship. Once in the room, D.T. found S.B. and her two brothers sleeping. D.T. then woke 
S.B., asked for his phone, removed her clothing and had sex with her against her will. After being 
booked and transferred to Las Vegas Juvenile Hall, the State filed a certification petition against 
D.T.  and charged him with sexual assault, battery with intent to commit a crime, burglary, 
kidnapping, and battery constituting domestic violence. D.T.’s counsel argued that D.T. was 
cognitively impaired and requested a competency evaluation. Following two evaluations, D.T. was 
deemed competent. The juvenile court stated that the nature and seriousness of D.T.’s offenses, 
including prior adjudicated offenses, outweighed the subjective factors in Seven Minors. 
Accordingly, the juvenile court certified D.T. as an adult. This appeal followed. 
 
Discussion:  
 
 Appellant contended the juvenile courts’ decision on three main premises. First, Appellant 
contended that the juvenile courts’ ruling was not sufficiently specific to satisfy procedural due 
process because the juvenile court merely listed the subjective factors in Seven Minors without 
explaining how each factor impacted public safety. As such, Appellant argued that the juvenile 
court failed to ensure that a full investigation was performed prior to the certification hearing.2 The 
Court noted that while the juvenile court’s order lacked detail, the order satisfied the minimum 
requirements of due process because the juvenile court’s review of the appellant’s psychological 
evaluation and opposition to the certification qualified as a full investigation.3 Moreover, the Court 
noted that there is no requirement for the juvenile court to explain how each subjective factor 
impacts public safety.4  
 
																																																						
1 By Karson Bright  
2 See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (the court requires, when making a decision to transfer a child to 
adult status, to make a statement of reasons for the transfer).  
3 See Lewis v. State, 478 P.2d 168, 171 (1970) (looking to court’s oral decision to determine compliance with Kent).  
4 But cf. In re Glenda Kay S., 103 Nev. 53, 59 (1987) (requiring the juvenile court to state the reasons for selecting a 
disposition of commitment in delinquency proceedings and why that disposition serves the interests of the child 
and/or State).  
Next, the Appellant argued that even if the juvenile court conducted an investigation, the 
inquiry was not a “meaningful review” because it was unclear what the juvenile court relied on to 
determine that the Appellant warranted adulted certification. The Appellant argued that a 
certification hearing is akin to a sentencing hearing and the juvenile court’s failure to consider 
D.T.’s subjective factors violated his due process right to an individualized certification 
determination.5 The Court rejected Appellant’s argument because the record showed that the 
juvenile court considered the seriousness of D.T.’s offenses, his prior adjudications, and his 
subjective factors, indicating that there was no error in the juvenile court’s certification 
determination.6 
 
 Finally, appellant contended that certification of cognitively impaired juveniles for adult 
proceedings is cruel and unusual punishment as proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.7 The Court 
stated that it considers statutory constitutional claims de novo and the challenger had the burden 
to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of the presumptively valid statute.8 While the United States 
Supreme Court has compared the significance of the certification decision with a sentencing 
hearing,9 it resolved that adult certification is not punishment.10 Therefore, appellant failed to 
demonstrate that the statute violated the Eighth Amendment.11 
 
Conclusion: 
 
 The Court found that the juvenile court reviewed all the necessary factors and properly 
certified D.T. to adult proceedings without violating his Eighth Amendment rights.  
																																																						
5  See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012) (mandatory life sentences without the possibility of parole for 
juvenile offenders convicted of homicide violates the Eighth Amendment). 
6  See In re Eric A.L., 123 Nev. 26, 33 (2007) (the juvenile court may consider the subjective factors in close cases 
where neither of the first two factors compels certification).  
7  See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 
536 U.S. 304 (2002).  
8  See In re William M., 124 Nev. 1150, 1157 (2008).  
9  See Kent, 383 U.S. at 557. 
10  See People v. Salas, 961 N.E.2d 831, 846 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (rejecting claim that mandatory certification of 
certain juvenile offenders constituted cruel and unusual punishment); cf. State v. Rice, 737 S.E.2d 485, 487 (S.C. 
2013) (rejecting claim that Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), applies to transfer proceedings because 
those proceedings do not determine punishment); but see William M., 124 Nev. at 1161 (noting that the California 
Supreme Court recognized certification “as the worst punishment the juvenile system is empowered to inflict” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  
11  See e.g., People ex rel. Birkett v. Konetski, 909 N.E.2d 783, 799 (Ill. 2009) (rejecting cruel and unusual 
punishment claim where statutory scheme did not impose a punishment).  
